Japan's Stewardship Code, formally the Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors (「責任ある機関投資家」の諸原則《日本版スチュワードシップ・コード》), is a set of principles for institutional investors issued by the Financial Services Agency (FSA). It was adopted on February 26, 2014 and revised on May 29, 2017, March 24, 2020 and June 26, 2025; the current text is the 2025 third revision. It traces back to the Japan Revitalization Strategy (日本再興戦略) adopted by the Cabinet in June 2013, after which the FSA set up an expert panel in August 2013 to draft it.
The Code defines stewardship responsibility as the responsibility of institutional investors to enhance the medium- to long-term investment return of their clients and beneficiaries (including ultimate beneficiaries) by improving investee companies' corporate value and fostering their sustainable growth, through constructive "purposeful dialogue" (engagement) based on in-depth knowledge of the companies and their business environment, and on consideration of sustainability (medium- to long-term sustainability, including ESG factors) consistent with their investment strategy.
It is the investor-side counterpart of the TSE's Corporate Governance Code, which places responsibility on company boards; the preface calls the two "two wheels of a cart" (車の両輪). The preface also says the Code does not aim to have investors intervene in the details of management, and that while voting is an important element, stewardship activity is not limited to voting.
The Code is written mainly with investment in Japanese listed shares in mind, but it can also be applied to other assets to the extent that helps fulfil stewardship responsibility.
Unlike laws and regulations, the Code is not legally binding, and it takes a principles-based approach (プリンシプルベース・アプローチ). Institutions that support it announce their acceptance (受入れ表明) and then comply or explain: where a principle does not suit their circumstances, they may leave it unimplemented if they fully explain why. The preface adds that it is not appropriate to conclude mechanically that an institution has failed its stewardship responsibility just because it does not implement part of the Code.
The FSA expects institutions that accept the Code to:
| Principle | What it says |
|---|---|
| 1 | Have and publish a clear policy on how to fulfil stewardship responsibility. |
| 2 | Have and publish a clear policy on managing the conflicts of interest that arise in fulfilling stewardship responsibility. |
| 3 | Monitor investee companies accurately, with a view to their sustainable growth. |
| 4 | Seek a shared understanding with investee companies and work to solve problems through constructive purposeful dialogue. |
| 5 | Have a clear policy on voting and on disclosing voting results; the voting policy should not be just a mechanical checklist but should contribute to the company's sustainable growth. |
| 6 | In principle, report periodically to clients and beneficiaries on how stewardship responsibility, including voting, is being fulfilled. |
| 7 | Have the skills to engage and to make stewardship judgments, based on in-depth knowledge of the companies and their business environment and on consideration of sustainability consistent with the investment strategy. |
| 8 | Service providers should provide appropriate services to institutional investors and help the investment chain as a whole function better. |
On June 7, 2024 the follow-up council set up by the FSA and the TSE published Action Program 2024 (アクション・プログラム 2024), which called for a further review of the Code to promote collective engagement and improve the transparency of beneficial shareholders (実質株主), so that stewardship would become more substantive. The FSA held three expert meetings from October 2024, put a draft out for public comment, and received comments from 46 individuals and organizations. The main changes:
The FSA expects institutions that had already accepted the Code to update their disclosures for the revision within six months of publication, by the end of December 2025 at the latest, announce the update, and notify the FSA.
From the FSA's list as of June 30, 2026:
| Type | Have ever accepted | Of which accepted the third revision |
|---|---|---|
| Trust banks etc. (信託銀行等) | 6 | 6 |
| Fund managers and investment advisers etc. (投信・投資顧問会社等) | 222 | 171 |
| Life and non-life insurers (生命保険・損害保険会社) | 26 | 26 |
| Pension funds etc. (年金基金等) | 89 | 82 |
| Other, including service providers | 11 | 10 |
| Total | 354 | 295 |
Pension funds etc. include the Corporate Pension Stewardship Promotion Council (企業年金スチュワードシップ推進協議会), which had 285 corporate pension members as of May 31, 2026. The list of individual institutions is an Excel file on the FSA's website.
This page explains the framework; for how a given institution actually votes and engages, rely on its own disclosures. Kabuto picks the day's material TDnet filings and summarizes them in English and Chinese, each linked to the TDnet original; see the front page.
| I-ne | |
| Tender offer price | ¥2,248 per share |
| Kadoya Seiyu | |
| Tender offer price | ¥2,655 per share |
| TKP Corporation | |
| Effective date | March 1, 2027 (scheduled) |
| M3, Inc. | |
| Tender offer price | ¥1,619 per share |
| Digital Hearts Holdings | |
| Consolidation ratio | 2,975,211 shares into 1 share |
| Shoei Corporation | |
| Shares transferred | 1.8 million shares |
| TOSE Co., Ltd. | |
| Effective date (scheduled) | Jan. 4, 2027 |
| NSK Ltd. | |
| Share transfer ratio (NSK:NTN) | 1:0.353 |
| M&A / TOB | 20 |
| Guidance | 7 |
| Buybacks | 11 |
| Dividends | 4 |
| Capital | 12 |
| Earnings | 16 |
| People | 3 |
Summaries of public disclosures by Japanese listed companies. Not investment advice; accuracy not guaranteed. Figures and dates in the TDnet originals prevail.
本站內容為日本上市公司公開開示之摘要整理,非投資建議,亦不保證正確。數字與日程以 TDnet 原文為準。
本サイトは日本の上場企業の適時開示を要約したものであり、投資助言ではありません。正確性は保証しません。数値・日程は TDnet の原文が優先します。