Fri, Nov 20, 2026中文About
Filings today 284 / Covered 15
Source: TDnet timely disclosures
Updated 11/20 20:30M&A / TOB 20 Guidance 7 Buybacks 11 Dividends 4 Capital 12 Earnings 16 People 3

Japan's Stewardship Code: Eight Principles for Institutional Investors, Comply or Explain, Proposal-by-Proposal Voting Disclosure, and the 2025 Revision

Last checked against the sources: 2026-11-12

What the Stewardship Code is

Japan's Stewardship Code, formally the Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors (「責任ある機関投資家」の諸原則《日本版スチュワードシップ・コード》), is a set of principles for institutional investors issued by the Financial Services Agency (FSA). It was adopted on February 26, 2014 and revised on May 29, 2017, March 24, 2020 and June 26, 2025; the current text is the 2025 third revision. It traces back to the Japan Revitalization Strategy (日本再興戦略) adopted by the Cabinet in June 2013, after which the FSA set up an expert panel in August 2013 to draft it.

The Code defines stewardship responsibility as the responsibility of institutional investors to enhance the medium- to long-term investment return of their clients and beneficiaries (including ultimate beneficiaries) by improving investee companies' corporate value and fostering their sustainable growth, through constructive "purposeful dialogue" (engagement) based on in-depth knowledge of the companies and their business environment, and on consideration of sustainability (medium- to long-term sustainability, including ESG factors) consistent with their investment strategy.

It is the investor-side counterpart of the TSE's Corporate Governance Code, which places responsibility on company boards; the preface calls the two "two wheels of a cart" (車の両輪). The preface also says the Code does not aim to have investors intervene in the details of management, and that while voting is an important element, stewardship activity is not limited to voting.

Who it covers

  • Asset managers (運用機関): institutions that are entrusted with money and invest in companies themselves. They are expected to help raise corporate value through day-to-day dialogue with investee companies.
  • Asset owners (アセットオーナー): holders of assets, including the providers of the money, such as corporate pension funds. They are expected to set a basic policy, act directly or through the managers they hire, and monitor those managers. Monitoring should focus on the quality of engagement, not on formal checks such as the number or length of meetings or the ratio of votes for and against.
  • Service providers for institutional investors (機関投資家向けサービス提供者): proxy advisors (議決権行使助言会社), pension consultants (年金運用コンサルタント) and the like. Principle 8 applies to them, and the other principles also apply insofar as they do not conflict with Principle 8.

The Code is written mainly with investment in Japanese listed shares in mind, but it can also be applied to other assets to the extent that helps fulfil stewardship responsibility.

Not law: acceptance and comply or explain

Unlike laws and regulations, the Code is not legally binding, and it takes a principles-based approach (プリンシプルベース・アプローチ). Institutions that support it announce their acceptance (受入れ表明) and then comply or explain: where a principle does not suit their circumstances, they may leave it unimplemented if they fully explain why. The preface adds that it is not appropriate to conclude mechanically that an institution has failed its stewardship responsibility just because it does not implement part of the Code.

The FSA expects institutions that accept the Code to:

  • publish on their own website their acceptance, the specific items each principle (including its guidance) asks them to disclose, such as their stewardship policy, and any principles they do not implement with the reasons;
  • review and update those items every year, and say so when they do;
  • notify the FSA of the web address. The FSA publishes a list of the institutions.

The eight principles

PrincipleWhat it says
1Have and publish a clear policy on how to fulfil stewardship responsibility.
2Have and publish a clear policy on managing the conflicts of interest that arise in fulfilling stewardship responsibility.
3Monitor investee companies accurately, with a view to their sustainable growth.
4Seek a shared understanding with investee companies and work to solve problems through constructive purposeful dialogue.
5Have a clear policy on voting and on disclosing voting results; the voting policy should not be just a mechanical checklist but should contribute to the company's sustainable growth.
6In principle, report periodically to clients and beneficiaries on how stewardship responsibility, including voting, is being fulfilled.
7Have the skills to engage and to make stewardship judgments, based on in-depth knowledge of the companies and their business environment and on consideration of sustainability consistent with the investment strategy.
8Service providers should provide appropriate services to institutional investors and help the investment chain as a whole function better.

What listed companies see

  • Votes disclosed by company and by proposal (Guidance 5-3): voting results should be published at least aggregated by major type of proposal, and also for each investee company and each proposal; an institution that thinks this is not appropriate should actively explain why. Reasons should be published, whether for or against, for proposals that are important for constructive dialogue, such as those that look like a conflict of interest or votes that need explaining under the voting policy.
  • Vote all shares (Guidance 5-1): institutions should seek to vote all their shares, deciding for or against each proposal in light of the company's situation and their dialogue with it. Where they expect to lend shares across the record date for voting rights, the voting policy should say how.
  • Proxy advisors (Guidance 5-4, 8-2, 8-3): institutions should not rely mechanically on proxy advice, and those that use an advisor should publish its name and how they use its services alongside their voting results. Advisors should set up a base in Japan with enough staff and organization to communicate effectively with companies and others, and publish their process for forming advice. Giving a company, at its request, the chance to check the information behind the advice, and passing the company's comments on to clients, is described as helping accuracy and transparency.
  • Passive funds (Guidance 4-4): because passive management has limited options to sell, institutions running passive money should engage and vote more actively from a medium- to long-term view.
  • Material non-public information (Guidance 4-7): constructive dialogue is possible on public information, and undisclosed material facts should be handled with equality among shareholders, so institutions should basically be cautious about receiving them in dialogue. An institution that receives them through a special relationship should first take steps such as suspending trading in the shares to avoid breaching the insider trading rules. The company-side rule is the fair disclosure rule.

What the June 26, 2025 third revision changed

On June 7, 2024 the follow-up council set up by the FSA and the TSE published Action Program 2024 (アクション・プログラム 2024), which called for a further review of the Code to promote collective engagement and improve the transparency of beneficial shareholders (実質株主), so that stewardship would become more substantive. The FSA held three expert meetings from October 2024, put a draft out for public comment, and received comments from 46 individuals and organizations. The main changes:

  • Explaining holdings (new Guidance 4-2): when an investee company asks, an institution should explain how many of its shares it holds, and should publish in advance its policy for responding to such requests. Before the revision this appeared only in a footnote saying it might be desirable. The FSA's acceptance list now shows, for trust banks, fund managers and investment advisers, and life and non-life insurers, whether each has published that policy.
  • Collective engagement (協働エンゲージメント, Guidance 4-6): engaging jointly with other institutional investors went from something that "may be beneficial where necessary" to "an important option". The FSA says the revision also took account of amendments to the FIEA and other laws, including clarifying who counts as a joint holder (共同保有者) under the large shareholding reporting rules; see Japan's 5% rule.
  • A slimmer, more principles-based code: for the first time, passages that had become established practice since adoption were deleted, merged or simplified. The FSA notes that this does not mean their purpose is unimportant. The preface also dropped its statement about reviewing the Code roughly every three years.

The FSA expects institutions that had already accepted the Code to update their disclosures for the revision within six months of publication, by the end of December 2025 at the latest, announce the update, and notify the FSA.

How many institutions have accepted

From the FSA's list as of June 30, 2026:

TypeHave ever acceptedOf which accepted the third revision
Trust banks etc. (信託銀行等)66
Fund managers and investment advisers etc. (投信・投資顧問会社等)222171
Life and non-life insurers (生命保険・損害保険会社)2626
Pension funds etc. (年金基金等)8982
Other, including service providers1110
Total354295

Pension funds etc. include the Corporate Pension Stewardship Promotion Council (企業年金スチュワードシップ推進協議会), which had 285 corporate pension members as of May 31, 2026. The list of individual institutions is an Excel file on the FSA's website.

This page explains the framework; for how a given institution actually votes and engages, rely on its own disclosures. Kabuto picks the day's material TDnet filings and summarizes them in English and Chinese, each linked to the TDnet original; see the front page.


Sources